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The international economic issues of concern to
the Third World are unfortunately not matters
for mutually agreed introduction in consequence
of a series of snappy negotiating conferences.
Rather, they are, by their very nature, long-term
problems to be resolved, if at all, only through
continuous pressure and probing for change in
literally hundreds of meetings of committees, and
innumerable bilateral and multilateral negotiating
sessions. As fast as one set of issues begins to
reach some kind of resolution, new ones inevitably
appear. No one expects the inequity of the world's
distribution of wealth and power to disappear
during our lifetimes. The Third World must
therefore not continually confine itself to prepar-
ing for the next conference. It must prepare itself
deliberately and carefully for the long haul as
well.
Progress with the specifics of international eco-
nomic re-ordering is rarely achieved in huge
international conferences of limited duration. The
function of these periodic resolution-passing festas
is a different onethat of educating, legitimising
and stage-setting for the detailed bargaining and
consultation which continues regardless of such
conferences. They may provide a necessary "shot
in the arm" for efforts which might otherwise
tend to flag; and they usually "open up" for more
public inspection the state of the discussion, the
positions taken by individual governments, and
the major points at issue. One must not, however,
mistake such conferences as the coming Nairobi
UNCTAD IV for the substance of what the
UNCTAD does. Nor ought one to seek to identify
what is the key issue for the Group of 77 without
reference to the specifics of the time and place
of any particular meeting. Assessments as to a
conference's "success" or "failure" are bound to
mislead, unless somehow related to reasonable
expectations for that particular conference.
There are now so many conferences dealing with
related aspects of the struggle for a new inter-
national economic order that one is hard-pressed
to tell which of them really "matter"for the resolu-
tion of any particular issue. If one is, for example,
concerned with the problem of market access for
manufactured exports from the Third World, was
the relevant forum the recent UNIDO conference
in Lima (which decreed industrialisation targets
for the year 2000), or is it the forthcoming
UNCTAD in Nairobi or the immediately subse-
quent 1LO conference in Geneva? Or is the most
important activity in this respect instead taking
place the whole time under GATT auspices in the
present round of bargaining on trade barrier
reductions? In the case of commodity policies,
what is the relationship between the ongoing
Conference on International Economic Co-opera-
tion in Paris, where raw materials prices are one
of four topics at issue, and the UNCTAD IV
which, until relatively recently, was itself expected
to focus upon commodity issues? Again, is there
any point in the passing of resolutions on inter-
national monetary reform in the UNCTAD when
the ultimate decision making power rests in the
IMF? Who thinks about these issues at all? Does
anyone?
International reform-mongering is a complex
business. The application of pressure at one point
can generate responses in totally different places
and sometimes in unpredictable ways. Unsuccess-
ful Third World pressure for a coffee agreement,
for instance, may indirectly generate a US tariff
reduction on footwear in partial compensation for
the coffee failure. Less hypothetically, it can
plausibly be argued that the development of
UNCTAD's integrated programme for commodi-
ties was among the influences which generated 1)
the liberalisation of the IMF's compensatory
financing facility and 2) the shifting of the arena
for the commodities discussion from the
UNCTAD to the Paris meetings. (Now that the
commodities issue has been "displaced" from
Nairobi it looks as if the most "promising" topic
for discussion there is that of technology transfer
decisions as to the revision of the Paris con-
vention, the elaboration of a code of conduct,
and so forth.) The outcomes of particular pres-
sures in this multidimensional bargaining process
between rich and poor quasi-oligopolistic blocs are
thus extremely difficult to predict.
One must nevertheless presume that careful plan-
fling of strategy and tactics can be fruitful. The
Third World collectively ought, surely, to seek to
identify feasible sequences for reform-mongering
efforts (distinguishing the proposals which may be
springboards for further action from those which
are deadends), to decide which forums are the
most appropriate for pushing which proposals, to
locate the points at which "the opposition" is at
its most vulnerable and lever upon them, to
co-ordinate with friendly sources of pressure
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within the rivals' camp, etc. There is a crying
need for an effective high-level secretariat to con-
sider such issues, on behalf of Third World
interests, to monitor, assess and co-ordinate the
growing number of regional and functional group-
ings of Third World countries, and generally to
support efforts of whatever kind geared to greater
collective self-reliance. There is at present no
Third World counterpart to the OECD.
More important in the long-run than the achieve-
ment of a "breakthrough" this year on any
particular international economic issue is the
creation of a high-level research and planning
secretariat with the capacity to develop strategies
and tactics across the whole range of international
economic issuesan OECD for the Third World.
The construction of such a secretariat is by now
quite feasible. There are obvious potential sources
of funding which were not there heretofore. The
expertisepolitical, economic, legal, scientific-
is today there as never before (and could, in any
case, be supplemented for specific purposes
through short-term hirings). The decision to move
forward with the building of such an institution
can be taken unilaterally without the agreement
of the developed countries. Without minimising
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the inevitable disagreements which may arise
within the Third World as to the details of its
financing, staffing, functions, location, etc. there
seems by now to be sufficient consensus regarding
the need for backup for the meetings of the
group of 77 and individual negotiating sessions
with the developed countries that a decision to
move forward could almost certainly quickly be
achieved. Once such a body is created the institu-
tions of the UN could return to their proper role
as brokers rather than continuing to perform
advocacy functions at the same time.
There are always risks with institutional innova-
tion. The divergent interests within the Third
World may render it difficult, for instance, for
such a secretariat fully to play its allotted role.
It could also end up merely creating another tier
of international bureaucracymore "cushy" jobs
for Third World technocrats. (This latter possi-
bility could be avoided by paying less than going
"international" rates, compensating the staff with
status and the élan of the group instead.) But the
potential long-run gains from the creation of an
OECD for the Third World are so great that
they are certainly worth taking. Is this not an
idea whose time has come?
